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AN EXCURSION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO REGULATOR’S BANK
REORGANIZATION PROBLEM
MASAHIKO EGAMI AND TADAO ORYU
ABSTRACT. The importance of the global financial system cannot be exaggerated. When a large financial
institution becomes problematic and is bailed out, that bank is often claimed as “too big to fail”. On the
other hand, to prevent bank’s failure, regulatory authorities adopt the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA)
against a bank that violates certain criteria, often measured by its leverage ratio. In this article, we provide
a framework where one can analyze the cost and effect of PCA’s. We model a large bank with deteriorating
asset and regulatory actions attempting to prevent a failure. The model uses the excursion theory of Le´vy
processes and finds an optimal leverage ratio that triggers a PCA. A nice feature includes it incorporates the
fact that social cost associated with PCA’s are be greatly affected by the size of banks subject to PCA’s, so
that one can see the cost of rescuing a bank “too big to fail”.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For a description of the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA, thereafter) we first quote from Shibut et al [21]: The
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provisions in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA) require that regulators set a threshold for critically undercapitalized institutions, and that regulators
promptly close institutions that breach the threshold unless they quickly recapitalize or merge with a healthier
institution. Many economists expected these provisions to result in dramatically reduced loss rates, or even zero
loss rates, for bank failures. In short, PCA provides a set of mandatory and discretionary actions to be taken by
banking supervisors when the bank’s capital ratio is declining. In many countries, as the above says, regulatory
authorities set minimum capital ratio and intervene bank operations once the bank’s capital falls short of the
minimum requirement.
Available studies on PCA are very scarce. Kocherlakova and Shim [13] and Shim [22] develop dynamic contract
models to analyze under what conditions regulators should liquidate a problematic bank or subsidize. While
liquidation is one alternative in PCA’s, we need to analyze a broader spectrum of actions including recapitalization,
cash infusion, and changes of risk-return profile of the bank’s asset. Considering the catastrophic turmoil in the
financial systems we experienced in the recent global financial crisis, a comprehensive analytical framework for
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the regulators’ interventions to a problem bank’s management is very much needed. Our model has, among other
things, the following features:
• we incorporate leverage ratio explicitly to describe the situation where even a large bank (with high lever-
age) can easily fail and to directly deal with leverage ratio threshold that triggers PCA;
• we use spectrally negative Le´vy processes for modeling sudden declines in the value of bank assets;
• we include cash infusions (at the beginning of PCA) that are often used for preventing outright insolvency,
change the bank’s risk-return profile, and consider the possibilities whether the bank comes back to the
normal operation or goes to liquidation;
• we incorporate various costs associated with PCA’s and compute optimal threshold level that triggers a
PCA in the sense that the total cost can be minimized; and
• we obtain a result, among other things, where the bank size has a crucial impact on the cost involved,
which well captures the real-life experience.
In this paper, we describe deterioration of leverage ratio as the excursion from the running maximum. It should
be best to explain through an example. We shall define everything rigourously in the next section. Let Y = eX
be the bank’s total asset value, where X is a spectrally negative Le´vy process and represents the fluctuation rate
of the asset. Let S be the running maximum of X. We assume that the bank increases its asset base as long as it
maintains the predetermined leverage ratio, defined as
Leverage ratio := Debt
Total Asset .
Let us set the said leverage ratio as e−b. For example, if the bank has the initial asset of Y0 = eX0 = 100 with
e−b = 0.8, it has total asset of 100 financed by debt 80 and equity 20. We can think of this ratio as the maximum
leverage ratio that is allowed by the banking regulations. We assume that the bank increases its asset base as long
as X = S where S is the running maximum of X and that the bank’s leverage ratio is maintained at 0.8. Hence if
the asset value appreciates to 120, then this would provide the bank with more lending opportunity since the equity
value is now 40. With this new equity level, the bank increases its leverage up to 0.8, that is, total asset increasing
to 200 financed by debt 160 and equity 40. Note that eS = eX = 200 and the debt level is e−b(eS) = eS−b = 160.
Now if the bank’s asset deteriorates due to defaults in the lending portfolio, we would have S − X > 0. In
other words, there appears an excursion from the running maximum of S. Since the asset level has been pegged at
eS = 200, the bank’s equity would be wiped out when eS−b = eX . That is, the process is absorbed at t = Tb, i.e,
the first time X goes below level S−b. Moreover, note that this model can incorporate the regulatory requirements
that the bank, when experiencing asset deterioration, need to sell the assets in order to reduce the leverage. For
example, assume that when the bank loses one dollar of asset, the bank loses its equity by α and reduces its debt
by 1− α, where α ∈ (0, 1]. Then, at the time the equity is wiped out, we have
eX ≤ eS
(
1−
1− e−b
α
)
,
that is, the process is absorbed when the excursion S −X reaches to log
(
1−e−b
α
− 1
)
.
An excursion theory for spectrally negative Le´vy processes has been developed recently. See Bertoin [6] as
a general reference. More specifically, an exit problem of the reflected process Y was studied by Avram et al.
[2], Pistrorius [18] [20] and Doney [9]. For spectrally negative Le´vy processes, or Le´vy processes with only
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negative jumps, a number of authors have succeeded in solving interesting stochastic optimization problems and in
extending the classical results by using the scale functions, which we shall review briefly later. We just name a few
here : [4, 5] for stochastic games, [3, 15, 17] for the optimal dividend problem, [1, 2] for American and Russian
options, and [11, 16] for credit risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a mathematical model to express PCA
program and then find an optimal threshold triggering level in Section 3. We shall illustrate the solution through a
numerical example in Section 3.1. Furthermore, we shall consider the situation where, after the bank successfully
emerges from the intervention (i.e., PCA ends), it again becomes problematic and subject to another PCA. This is
in Section 4. We attach a brief summary of results from the theory of scale functions associated with spectrally
negative Le´vy processes in Appendix.
2. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Let the spectrally negative Levy processes Xi = {Xit ; t ≥ 0} (i = 0, 1) represent the state variable defined on
the probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω is the set of all possible realization of the stochastic economy, and P is a
probability measure defined on F . We denote by F = {Ft}t≥0 the filtration with respect to which X0 and X1 are
adapted and with the usual conditions being satisfied. The Laplace exponent ψi of Xi, i=0,1, is given by
ψi(λ) = µiλ+
1
2
σ2i λ
2 +
∫
(−∞,0)
(eλx − 1− λx1l(x>−1))Πi(dx),
where µi ≥ 0, σi ≥ 0, and Πi is a measure concentrated on R\{0} satisfying
∫
R
(1 ∧ x2)Πi(dx) < ∞. It is
well-known that ψi is zero at the origin and convex on R+.
We define the process X = {Xt; t ≥ 0} as the solution to the stochastic differential equation
dXt = dX
I(t)
t and X0 = x,
where I = {I(t); t ≥ 0} is the right-continuous switching process which satisfies I(t) ∈ {0, 1} for every t ∈ R+.
We postpone (see (2.1)) the rigorous mathematical definition of the process I to make the explanation of our model
smoother.
The bank’s total asset value is represented by the process Y = {eXt ; t ≥ 0}. Therefore, X represents the
fluctuation rate of the bank’s total asset value. When I(t) = 0, the bank is well capitalized with satisfactory
leverage ratio and thus is not subject to the regulator’s PCA. Our dX0 corresponds to the dynamics while not
being controlled. On the other hand, when I(t) = 1, a PCA is applied and the bank is taken into strict supervision
by the regulator with corresponding asset fluctuation rate dX1. In general, it may be often the case that
µ1 < µ0 and σ1 < σ0
to reflect more conservative risk-return profile during the PCA period. We introduce F-stopping times τ+c and τ−c
(c ≥ 0) defined by
τ+c = inf{t ≥ 0 : X
1
t ≥ c}, and τ−c = inf{t ≥ 0 : X1t ≤ c}.
In addition, let S = {St; t ≥ 0} be defined by St = supu∈[0,t]Xu ∨ s, and we introduce the F-stopping times Tc
(c > 0) defined by
Tc = inf{t ≥ 0 : St −Xt ≥ c}.
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We assume that PCA is applied (i.e. the process I changes form 0 to 1) at t = Tb′ , where b ≥ b′ ≥ 0. Note that
this is the time when the bank’s leverage ratio eS−b/eX exceeds the level eb′−b (not the level e−b′). Indeed, since
X < S − b′, the leverage ratio is
eS−b
eX
>
eS−b
eS−b
′
= eb
′−b.
This threshold b′ is determined by the regulator and we call it the PCA trigger level. One of our main problems
is to calculate of the total cost involved in PCA’s until the bank’s lifetime. When the bank undergoes a PCA, one
of the two scenarios is possible: the bank becomes insolvent (S −X ≥ b), or the bank successfully improves its
leverage ratio to e−b (S −X = 0).
Additionally, we assume that when a PCA is applied, the bank’s asset is pushed up to the target level
e
ST
b′
−a
, a ∈ [0, b) is some constant.
This is done by injecting funds (taxpayers’ money) to improve the leverage ratio to some predetermined level ea−b.
More specifically, since the PCA moves the level of X to STb′ − a and the leverage ratio at the time of PCA is
STb′−b, then the new leverage ratio becomes
e
ST
b′
−b
e
ST
b′
−a
= ea−b.
The amount of money to be poured (as equity) is thereby the difference between the asset values before and after
PCA is applied.
To compute the initial cost to be paid, we need to record both of the asset values before and after being pushed
up. Therefore, we define the random variable X as X = XTb′ and, afterward, redefine XTb′ by XTb′ = STb′ − a.
That is, eX represents the asset value before the cash infusion is made, and eXTb′ indicates the asset value after the
bank receives fresh money. This way, eX remains representing the asset value of the bank, and we can represent
the initial cash to be poured by
e
ST
b′
−a
− eX .
Let us emphasize that this value is large when the size of the bank is large (with a large value of eS ). Note that
though we use this form of initial cost throughout this paper, the initial cost can be generalized to the form of
c(X,STb′ ), where c : R
2
+ 7→ R+, and in those cases, this cost may include, for example, the cash to be set aside for
the worst scenario of the bank’s insolvency (the bank’s depositors will be bailed out by the FDIC), or the present
value of administration costs to alter bank’s risk-return profile from ψ0 to ψ1.
Let an F-stopping time τ be the time PCA ends, then τ should be represented by τ = Tb′ + (τ+a ∧ τ−a−b) ◦ θTb′ ,
where (θt)t∈R+ is shift operator, and the process I can be defined as
I(t) =

0 for t < Tb′ , τ ≤ t1 for t ∈ [Tb′ , τ).(2.1)
In summary, at time t = Tb′ , the bank’s leverage ratio becomes worse than the PCA trigger level, then a PCA
starts and the bank goes under the regulator’s control. The corresponding excursion height is STb′ −X . Then the
regulatory authority injects in the amount of eSTb′−a − eX and the bank’s leverage ratio is improved to ea−b. To
recover its leverage ratio to e−b, X1 must go up in the amount of a, and the time is denoted by τ+a . However, if
X1 goes down in the amount of b− a, the bank becomes insolvent, and the corresponding time is τ−a−b.
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In addition to the initial cost, there will be the running cost over time while PCA continues and the social cost
(the penalty) when the bank becomes insolvent. We assume that (1) the running cost will be incurred in proportion
to the duration of PCA being in place and the ratio is α ≥ 0, and (2) the social cost to the economy caused by the
bank’s final insolvency is determined by βeSTb−b (β ≥ 0), that is, some parameter β times the bank’s asset when
it becomes insolvent. This represents the fact that the cost of bank’s failure gets larger as the size of the bank is
large. Note that this penalty function may be generalized as the initial cost function. Finally, the expected cost C1
for the PCA can be represented by
(2.2) C1(x, s; b′) = Ex,s
[
e−qTb′
(
eSTb′−a − eX
)
+ α
∫ τ
Tb′
e−qtdt+ e−qτ
(
βeSTb′−b
)
1l{τ+a ◦θT
b′
>τ−
a−b
◦θT
b′
}
]
,
which we shall calculate in the next section. Moreover, we analyze the cost minimizing PCA trigger level given
the values of a.
3. SOLUTION
To solve the problem, we divide the cost function C1 into three blocks;
C1(x, s; b
′) =


C01 (x, s; b
′) if s− x > b′,
C11 (x, s; b
′) if s− x = 0,
C21 (x, s; b
′) if s− x ∈ (0, b′).
As the first step, we calculate C01 (x, s; b′), the cost involved in the PCA when S0 −X0 ≥ b′; in other words, PCA
is applied at time t = 0. In particular, this is always the case when b′ = 0. The explanation of scale functions in
the following lemma will be attached in the appendix. Note that the scale functions of X0 and X1 are explicitly
known in some cases including the case they have no jumps (see Hubalek and Kyprianou [12] for example).
Proposition 3.1. If S0 −X0 ≥ b′, then
C01 (x, s; b
′) = es−a − ex +
1
q
(
1− Z
(q)
1 (b− a)− (1− Z
(q)
1 (b))
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
)
(3.1)
+βes−b
(
Z
(q)
1 (b− a)− Z
(q)
1 (b)
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
)
,
where W (q)i , i = 1, 2, is q-scale function of Xi, and
Z
(q)
i (x) = 1 + q
∫ x
0
W
(q)
i (y)dy.
Proof. Since S0 −X0 ≥ b′, we have Tb′ = 0 and
E
x,s
[∫ τ
Tb′
e−qtdt
]
= Es−a,s
[∫ τ+a ∧τ−a−b
0
e−qtdt
]
=
1
q
(
1− Es−a,s
[
e−q(τ
+
a ∧τ
−
a−b
)
])
=
1
q
(
1− Es−a,s
[
1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}e
−qτ+a
]
− Es−a,s
[
1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
])
.
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In the same way, we have
E
x,s
[
e−qτ
(
βe
ST
b′
−b
)
1l{τ+a ◦θT
b′
>τ−
a−b
◦θT
b′
}
]
= βes−bEs−a,s
[
1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−q(τ+a ∧τ
−
a−b
)
]
= βes−bEs−a,s
[
1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
]
Then we can write
C01 (x, s; b
′) = es−a − ex +
1
q
(
1− Es−a,s
[
1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}e
−qτ+a
]
− Es−a,s
[
1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
])
(3.2)
+βes−bEs−a,s
[
1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
]
.
It is well known (see Kyprianou [14] and Doney [9]) that
E
s−a,s[1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}e
−qτ+a ] =
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
, and
E
s−a,s[1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b ] = Z
(q)
1 (b− a)− Z
(q)
1 (b)
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
.
Hence we have (3.1). 
Now we calculate the cost in the case that S0 = X0 = s by using Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.2. If b′ > 0 and S0 = X0 = s, then
C11 (s, s; b
′) =
σ2
2
(
(W
(q)′
0 (b
′))2
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
−W
(q)′′
0 (b
′)
)∫ ∞
s
dm exp
(
−(m− s)
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
)
C01 (m− b
′,m; b′)(3.3)
+
∫∫
E
Π(dh)dy
(
W
(q)′
0 (y)−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (y)
)
×
(∫ ∞
s
dm exp
(
−(m− s)
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
)
C01 (m− y + h,m; b
′)
)
,
where E = {(y, h) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ y < b′, y − b < h < y − b′}.
Proof. As for the initial cost part of (2.2), we have, by splitting into the case where PCA trigger level b′ is contin-
uously crossed and the case where it is overshot by a downward jump,
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′
(
e
ST
b′
−a
− e
ST
b′
−X
)]
=
∫ ∞
s
dmEs,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
∈dm}
] (
em−a − em−b
′
)
+
∫∫∫
D
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−∈dm}
] (
em−a − em−y+h
)
,
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where D = {(m, y, h) ∈ R3 : 0 ≤ y < b′, y− b < h < y− b′,m > s}. Note that XTb′− is, as usual, the pre-jump
position of X at time Tb′ . Because of the Markov property of X0 and X1, we have
E
s,s
[∫ τ
Tb′
e−qtdt
]
= Es,s
[
e−qTb′
∫ (τ+a ∧τ−a−b)◦θTb′
0
e−qtdt
]
= Es,s
[
e−qTb′
]
E
s,s
[∫ (τ+a ∧τ−a−b)◦θTb′
0
e−qtdt
∣∣∣∣FTb′
]
= Es,s
[
e−qTb′
]
E
s−a,s
[∫ τ+a ∧τ−a−b
0
e−qtdt
]
= Es,s
[
e−qTb′
] 1
q
(
1− Es−a,s
[
e−q(τ
+
a ∧τ
−
a−b
)
])
= Es,s
[
e−qTb′
] 1
q
(
1− Es−a,s
[
1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}e
−qτ+a
]
− Es−a,s
[
1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
])
=
(∫ ∞
s
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
∈dm}
]
+
∫∫∫
D
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−∈dm}
])
×
1
q
(
1− Em−a,m
[
1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}e
−qτ+a
]
− Em−a,m
[
1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
])
.
On the penalty part, we have
E
s,s
[
e−qτ
(
βe
ST
b′
−b
)
1l{τ+a ◦θT
b′
>τ−
a−b
◦θT
b′
}
]
= Es,s
[
e
−q(Tb′+τ
−
a−b
◦θT
b′
(
βe
ST
b′
−b
)
1l{τ+a ◦θT
b′
>τ−
a−b
◦θT
b′
}
]
=
∫ ∞
s
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
∈dm}
]
E
m−a,m
[
βem−b1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
]
+
∫∫∫
D
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−∈dm}
]
E
m−a,m
[
βem−b1l{τ+a >τ−a−b}e
−qτ−
a−b
]
.
Then, by summing those three parts, we can write in view of (3.2)
C11 (s, s; b
′) =
∫ ∞
s
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
∈dm}
]
C01 (m− b
′,m; b′)(3.4)
+
∫∫∫
D
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−∈dm}
]
C01 (m− y + h,m; b
′).
Finally, it is known from Theorem 1 and 2 in Pistrorius [19] that
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
∈dm}
]
=
σ2
2
(
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
−W
(q)′′
0 (b
′)
)
exp
(
−(m− s)
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
)
dm,
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and
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−∈dm}
]
= Π(dh)dydm
(
W
(q)′
0 (y)−
(W
(q)′
0 (b
′))2
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (y)
)
exp
(
−(m− s)
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
)
.
Hence we have (3.3). 
Note that some condition is needed for the finiteness of C11 (s, s; b′), and the following Remark shows it.
Remark 3.1. C11 (s, s; b′) <∞ if and only if 1−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
< 0.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, we have
C01 (m− u,m; b
′) =
(
e−a − e−u + βe−b
(
Z
(q)
1 (b− a)− Z
(q)
1 (b)
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
))
em
+
1
q
(
1− Z
(q)
1 (b− a)− (1− Z
(q)
1 (b))
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
)
, for m ≥ s and u ∈ [b′, b).
Hence, there are some positive constants M1,M2 <∞ with which we can write
∫ ∞
s
dm exp
(
−(m− s)
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
)
C01(m− u,m; b
′)
=
∫ ∞
s
dm
(
M1 exp
((
1−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
)
m
)
+M2 exp
(
−m
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
))
, for u ∈ [b′, b),
and therefore, the integral above is finite if and only if 1 −W (q)
′
0 (b
′)/W
(q)
0 (b
′) < 0. Since y − h ∈ (b′, b) on E
and the other terms in (3.3) satisfy
σ2
2
(
(W
(q)′
0 (b
′))2
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
−W
(q)′′
0 (b
′)
)
<∞, and
∫∫
E
Π(dh)dy
(
W
(q)′
0 (y)−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (y)
)
<∞ for b′ > 0,
we can say that C11 (s, s; b′) <∞ if and only if 1−W
(q)′
0 (b
′)/W
(q)
0 (b
′) < 0. 
Finally, we calculate C21 (x, s; b′) in the case that S0 −X0 ∈ (0, b′), by using Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
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Proposition 3.3. If b′ > 0 and S0 −X0 ∈ (0, b′), then
C21 (x, s; b
′) =
σ2
2
(
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)
)
C01 (s− b
′, s; b′)(3.5)
+
∫∫
E
Π(dh)dy
(
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (y)−W
(q)
0 (y − s+ x)
)
C01 (s− y + h, s; b
′)
+
W
(q)
0 (b− s+ x)
W
(q)
0 (b)
C11 (s, s; b
′).
Proof. In the case S0−X0 ∈ (0, b′), two scenarios are possible. One is that X reaches to s before PCA is applied,
and the other is that PCA applies before reaching s. Mathematically, this means that
C21 (x, s; b
′) = Ex,s
[
e−qτ
+
s−x1l{τ+s−x<τ−s−x−b′}C
1
1(s, s; b
′)
]
+Ex,s
[
e
−qτ−
s−x−b′1l{τ+s−x>τ−s−x−b′}C
0
1 (Xτ−
s−x−b′
, Sτ−
s−x−b′
; b′)
]
= Ex,s
[
e−qτ
+
s−x1l{τ+s−x<τ−s−x−b′}
]
C11 (s, s; b
′)
+Ex,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
=s}
]
C01 (s− b
′, s; b′)
+
∫∫
E
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−=s}
]
C01 (s− y + h, s; b
′).
From Theorem 1 and 2 in Pistrorius [20] again, we have
E
x,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
=s}
]
=
σ2
2
(
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)
)
,
and
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−=s}
]
= Π(dh)dy
(
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (y)−W
(q)
0 (y − s+ x)
)
.
Hence we have (3.5). 
Now we have all three parts of C1 and use this result for a numerical example.
3.1. Example. In this section, we solve a specific example. We assume X0 and X1 are Brownian motions with
drifts and exponentially distributed jumps;
(3.6) Xt = µt+ σBt −
Nt∑
j=1
ǫj,
where µ, σ ≥ 0, ǫj are i.i.d. random variables which are exponentially distributed with parameter ρ > 0 and Nt
is an independent Poisson process with intensity a > 0. Before solving the problem, we introduce the explicit
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representation of the scale function for the process. The Laplace exponent ψ of X has the following simple
representation;
ψ(λ) =
σ2
2
λ2 + µλ−
aλ
ρ+ λ
, λ ≥ 0.
The equation ψ(λ) = q (q > 0) has three real solutions {Φ(q), α, β} (Φ(q) > α > β), and the q-scale function
W (q) of X is given by
(3.7) W (q)(x) = e
Φ(q)x
ψ′(Φ(q))
+
eαx
ψ′(α)
+
eβx
ψ′(β)
.
Let ψi, i = 0, 1 be defined by
ψi(λ) =
σ2i
2
λ2 + µiλ−
aiλ
ρi + λ
, λ ≥ 0.
Figure 1 shows the graph of C1(0, 0; b′) with the settings X0 = S0 = 0, b = 1, a = 0.3, q = 0.1, α = β = 1,
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65
b'
1
2
3
4
C1H0, 0, b'L
FIGURE 1. the graph of C1(0, 0; b′).
µ0 = 0.2, σ0 = 0.2, µ1 = 0.1, σ1 = 0.1, a0 = a1 = 1, and ρ0 = ρ1 = 10. The assigned value of b = 1 may not
be realistic; b = 1 means that the bank uses e−1 = 0.3679 as its leverage ratio (i.e. (Debt)/(Total Asset)) during
the normal business period. This is obviously too restrictive for the banks. Nontheless, we use this number (and
others) since function values are too sensitive to conduct comparative statics analysis with more realistic values
like b = − log 0.8.
In Figure 1, when we fix a at 0.3, b∗ = 0.5401 is the optimal PCA trigger level where C1(0, 0; b′) is minimized,
and the corresponding cost is C1(0, 0; b∗) = 3.019. An interesting character about C1(0, 0; b′) is that C1(0, 0; b′)
diverges to infinity on b′ > 0.6701. Note that at b′ = 0.6701, we have W (q)
′
0 (b
′)/W
(q)
0 (b
′) = 1; see Remark
3.1. This can be interpreted as follows: With a large b′, since it is not likely to initiate a PCA, X shall be at very
high level when a PCA is actually applied and therefore the initial cost part and the penalty part become too large.
This result suggests the importance of discrete choice of PCA trigger level to prevent the bank from becoming too
costly to rescue. On the other hand, the reason that the cost is relatively high when b′ is near to a is that, in these
situations, PCA may be applied too early for the cost to be discounted enough.
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(i)σ1 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 from top to bottom.
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65
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1
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3
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C1H0, 0, b'L
(ii)µ1 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 from top to bottom.
FIGURE 2.
Figure 2 (i) and (ii) are the results of some comparative statics: we vary σ1 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 and µ1 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4,
respectively (the other parameters remain the same). These graphs show that the increase of σ1 and µ1 raises the
optimal threshold b∗ and lower the optimized cost C1(0, 0; b∗). The results from various volatility parameters is
worth mentioning. With a larger σ1, the speed to reach either S or S − b shall become greater, so that the running
cost shall be smaller. The reason for a higher PCA trigger level with a higher σ1 is so simple since there are several
effects are involved. However, it may be interpreted this way: since a higher volatility may increase the danger of
becoming insolvent and ending up paying penalty (i.e., reaching s − b after PCA was implemented), it would be
safer to start a PCA earlier.
a 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
b∗ 0.4593 0.5136 0.5401 0.5566 0.5675 0.6
C1(0, 0, b∗) 1.992 2.690 3.019 3.120 3.064 2.973
TABLE 1. Changes of b∗ and C1(0, 0; b∗)
Finally, we change the level of a. Table 1 shows b∗ and C1(0, 0; b∗) with a = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.6, and Figure
3 is the graphs of C1(0, 0; b′) with these a’s. The optimal threshold b∗ moves to the same direction with a, but
the amount of change is small compared to that of a. On the other hand, the cost C1(0, 0; b∗) doesn’t change
monotonously. According to the table, around a = 0.4, the cost has a local maximum. One of interesting results
is that when a = 0.6, b∗ is a boundary solution 0.6. This means that if X continuously crosses the level S − b′,
indeed PCA is applied but the regulator doesn’t pay initial cost and there doesn’t occur positive jump of X.
4. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE PCA’S
We considered so far that PCA is applied only once and calculated the cost associated with it. However, after
the bank recovers its leverage ratio to e−b thanks to a PCA, it can be under the regulator’s control again when the
leverage ratio deteriorates to eb′−b or worse (S − X ≥ b′). Now we incorporate the possibility that PCA’s are
repeatedly applied until the bank becomes finally insolvent. With the method we shall provide here, while it is not
of an explicit form, one can recursively calculate the cost for multiple PCA’s. For a mathematical representation,
we redefine the process I by
I(t) = 1l{τ1≤t<τ2} + 1l{τ3≤t<τ4} + · · ·+ 1l{τ2n−1≤t<τ2n} + · · · , t ∈ R+
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FIGURE 3. the graphs of C1(0, 0; b′) with a = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5.
where τn, n = 1, 2, . . . are F-stopping times defined recursively by τ1 = Tb′ ,
τ2n = τ2n−1 + (τ
+
a ∧ τ
−
a−b) ◦ θτ2n−1 ,
τ2n+1 = τ2n + Tb′ ◦ θτ2n ,
and (θt)t∈R+ is shift-operator. This definition means that the bank goes under the nth PCA at time τ2n−1, and
recovers or becomes insolvent at time τ2n. Note that τ = τ2.
Additionally, we need the asset values at time τ2n−1 before pushed up, so in the same way as Section 3, we
define Xn = Xτ2n−1 for n = 1, 2, . . . and then, redefine Xτ2n−1 = Sτ2n−1 − a.
Then the cost Cn(x, s; b′) for the nth PCA can be represented by
Cn(x, s, b
′) = Ex,s
[
1lAn
(
e−qτ2n−1
(
eSτ2n−1−a − eXn
)
+ α
∫ τ2n
τ2n−1
e−qtdt
+e−qτ2n
(
βeSτ2n−1−b
)
1l{τ+a ◦θτ2n−1>τ−a−b◦θτ2n−1}
)]
,
where An is the event in which the bank is under regulator’s strict supervision more than n times until insolvency;
that is, An can be written by A1 = Ω and An =
⋂n−1
k=1{τ
+
a ◦ θτ2k−1 < τ
−
a−b ◦ θτ2k−1} for n = 2, 3, . . ., and the total
cost C(x, s, b′) is given by
C(x, s; b′) =
∞∑
n=1
Cn(x, s; b
′).
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Proposition 4.1. If S0 = X0 = s, then
Cn+1(s, s; b
′) =
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
∫ ∞
s
dm exp
(
−(m− s)
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
)
Cn(m,m; b
′)
(4.1)
×
(
σ2
2
(
(W
(q)′
0 (b
′))2
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
−W
(q)′′
0 (b
′)
)
+
∫∫
E
Π(dh)dy
(
W
(q)′
0 (y)−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (y)
))
,
for n = 1, 2, . . . .
Proof. The first-time PCA ends at time t = τ2. Since X1 only have negative jumps by definition, we have
Sτ2 = STb′ . Hence
Cn+1(s, s; b
′) = Es,s
[
e−qτ21lA2Cn(Sτ2 , Sτ2 ; b′)
]
= Es,s
[
e−qTb′Cn(STb′ , STb′ ; b
′)
(
e−q(τ
+
a ∧τ
−
a−b
)1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}
)
◦ θT ′
b
]
= Es,s
[
e−qTb′Cn(STb′ , STb′ ; b
′)
]
E
s,s
[(
e−q(τ
+
a ∧τ
−
a−b
)1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}
)
◦ θT ′
b
∣∣∣FT ′
b
]
= Es−a,s
[
e−q(τ
+
a ∧τ
−
a−b
)1l{τ+a <τ−a−b}
](∫ ∞
s
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′1l{ST
b′
−X=b′,ST
b′
∈dm}
]
C1(m,m; b
′)
+
∫∫∫
D
E
s,s
[
e−qTb′ 1l{ST
b′
−−XT
b′
−∈dy,X−XT
b′
−∈dh,ST
b′
−∈dm}
]
C1(m,m; b
′)
)
.
From Theorem 1 and 2 in Pistrorius [20], we have (4.1). 
As for the finiteness of Cn(s, s; b′), the following remark can be shown in the same way as Remark 3.1.
Remark 4.1. If Cn(m,m; b′) < ∞ for m ∈ [s,∞), then Cn+1(s, s; b′) < ∞. Hence by Remark 3.1, if 1 −
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)/W
(q)
0 (b
′) < 0, then Cn(s, s; b′) <∞ for every n ≥ 1.
Since we already calculated C1 in the previous subsection, Cn is obtained by repeatedly using this proposition
when S0 = X0. The following two propositions are for the other cases; S0 −X0 ≥ b′ and S0 −X0 ∈ (0, b′). We
skip the proofs here since the essential techniques used are the same as in the propositions above. Note that the
results of Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 are needed for the calculation in Proposition 4.3.
Proposition 4.2. If S0 −X0 ≥ b′, then
Cn+1(x, s; b
′) =
W
(q)
1 (b− a)
W
(q)
1 (b)
Cn(s, s; b
′).(4.2)
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Proposition 4.3. If S0 −X0 ∈ (0, b′), then
Cn(x, s; b
′) =
σ2
2
(
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)−
W
(q)′
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)
)
Cn(s− b
′, s; b′)(4.3)
+
∫∫
E
Π(dh)dy
(
W
(q)
0 (b
′ − s+ x)
W
(q)
0 (b
′)
W
(q)
0 (y)−W
(q)
0 (y − s+ x)
)
Cn(s− y + h, s; b
′)
+
W
(q)
0 (b− s+ x)
W
(q)
0 (b)
Cn(s, s; b
′).
where Cn(·, ·; b′)’s on the right-hand side can be computed by Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
5. APPENDIX
5.1. Scale functions. Associated with every spectrally negative Le´vy process, there exists a (q-)scale function
W (q) : R 7→ R; q ≥ 0,
that is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞) and is uniquely determined by∫ ∞
0
e−βxW (q)(x)dx =
1
ψ(β)− q
, β > Φ(q).
Fix a > x > 0. If τ+a is the first time the process goes above a and τ0 is the first time it goes below zero, then
we have
E
x
[
e−qτ
+
a 1{τ+a <τ0, τ+a <∞}
]
=
W (q)(x)
W (q)(a)
and Ex
[
e−qτ01{τ+a >τ0, τ0<∞}
]
= Z(q)(x)− Z(q)(a)
W (q)(x)
W (q)(a)
,
(5.1)
where
Z(q)(x) := 1 + q
∫ x
0
W (q)(y)dy, x ∈ R.
Here we have
(5.2) W (q)(x) = 0 on (−∞, 0) and Z(q)(x) = 1 on (−∞, 0].
We also have
E
x
[
e−qτ0
]
= Z(q)(x)−
q
Φ(q)
W (q)(x), x > 0.(5.3)
In particular, W (q) is continuously differentiable on (0,∞) if Π does not have atoms and W (q) is twice-
differentiable on (0,∞) if σ > 0; see, e.g., [8]. Throughout this paper, we assume the former.
Assumption 5.1. We assume that Π does not have atoms.
Fix q > 0. The scale function increases exponentially;
W (q)(x) ∼
eΦ(q)x
ψ′(Φ(q))
as x ↑ ∞.(5.4)
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There exists a (scaled) version of the scale function WΦ(q) = {WΦ(q)(x);x ∈ R} that satisfies
WΦ(q)(x) = e
−Φ(q)xW (q)(x), x ∈ R(5.5)
and ∫ ∞
0
e−βxWΦ(q)(x)dx =
1
ψ(β +Φ(q))− q
, β > 0.
Moreover WΦ(q)(x) is increasing, and as is clear from (5.4),
WΦ(q)(x) ↑
1
ψ′(Φ(q))
as x ↑ ∞.(5.6)
Regarding its behavior in the neighborhood of zero, it is known that
W (q)(0) =
{
0, unbounded variation
1
µ
, bounded variation
}
and W (q)′(0+) =


2
σ2
, σ > 0
∞, σ = 0 and Π(0,∞) =∞
q+Π(0,∞)
µ2
, compound Poisson

 ;
(5.7)
see Lemmas 4.3-4.4 of [16]. For a comprehensive account of the scale function, see [6, 7, 14, 16]. See [10, 23] for
numerical methods for computing the scale function.
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